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GENDER DIVERSITY OF BOARDROOMS AND
FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
Perihan Iren*
*College of Business, Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, UAE

Abstract
The impact of boardroom diversity on firm financial performance has attracted growing
research interest in recent years. However, due to the lack of readily available datasets for other
parts of the world, most of the evidence is based on the US data. The purpose of this study is to
examine the relationship between gender diversity in the boardrooms and firm financial
performance in a region, where it has never been studied before. Using a sample of 60 firms
listed in Abu Dhabi and Dubai Stock Exchanges, first the impact of gender diverse boards on the
accounting value of the firms is analyzed. Afterwards, stock price reactions to the
announcement of the gender quotas on corporate boards in the UAE are examined. The results
do not show a significant impact of female directors on the firm’s both accounting and market
value. However, these results should be interpreted carefully since the presence of women in
leading positions might affect different aspects of the firm practices.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Gender Diversity, UAE

reaches only to 36.3 % by 2012. The numbers get
worse when we look at the Middle East. By 2008,
percentage of female board of members was only
1.5% for the whole GCC and 1.8 % for the UAE.
Although the numbers are still very small, the future
looks more promising as the percentages increase.
While in 2008 there were only 6 females sitting on
the boards of the UAE listed companies, as of 2012
the number has more than doubled and reached to
18. It is very likely that this increasing trend will
continue since more educated and highly qualified
females join the UAE workforce every year, who are
as well supported by the legislation passed in 2012,
requiring female board members in every public
company.
The corporate world, legislators and regulators
had reached a consensus on the benefits of diversity
in the boardroom. Having board members with
different ethnic backgrounds, age, experience,
education and gender is believed to add value to the
firm, bring diverse thoughts to the boardroom,
enhance the decision making and subsequently
increase the firm financial performance. However,
this issue still needs further empirical investigationparticularly for the Middle East region, which is
traditionally shaped by conservative and patriarchal
cultures. In these societies, authority from women
can be met by resistance. Even though these views
and attitudes are relaxed compared to those over 50
years ago, Mostafa (2005) showed that only 20% of
older people viewed themselves as having open
minds towards female managers. Although many
studies had shown the positive effects of gender
diversity on financial performance in the Western
World, studies concentrating outside the US and
Europe are very scarce. Therefore, the aim of this
study is to investigate the relationship between the
female existence on corporate boards and the firm
financial performance in the UAE.

1. INTRODUCTION
Boardroom diversity is a hotly debated issue in the
corporate finance area. The literature has proved
that diversity enhances the boardroom decision
making and subsequently leads to better financial
performance. Gender diversity in the boardrooms,
however, is more of a controversial topic since the
results of empirical evidence is mixed. While some
studies have confirmed the positive relationship
between female existence on boards and financial
performance,
some
found
no
significant
relationship. One of the reasons of the nonestablished evidence of the relationship between
gender diversity and firm financial performance is
the low number of female participation in the
boardroom, while another is the lack of readily
available data which would enable researchers to
study the relationship. The highest percentage of
female representation is seen in Scandinavian
countries, Norway being the highest (22% in 2008),
while the number gets exceptionally low in Arab
countries (1.8% in the UAE as end of 2008). The aim
of this study is to investigate the effects of female
board participation on firm financial performance in
the UAE. The study will contribute to the literature
by providing evidence from a region where this issue
had never been studied before.
Although gender diversity is generally viewed
as a norm for equity and fairness, representation of
women on corporate boards is very low throughout
the world. As of 2009, only 15.2% of board members
of the US Fortune 500 companies were females
(Catalyst, 2009). Other Western countries also show
a similar trend, except for Scandinavian countries
where legal and political pressure enforces greater
women representation on boards. However, even in
Norway where the women representation is the
highest, female participation in the boardroom
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The remainder of the study is organized as
follows. Section 2 discusses the previous evidence
on the relationship between gender diversity in the
boards and the firm performance. Section 3
discusses data and variables, Section 4 explains
methodology and hypothesis. The results are
presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.

Data
outside
the
US,
also
presented
inconclusive evidence. While a positive effect on firm
value is shown by Campbell and Minguez - Vera
(2008) in Spain and by Luckerath-Rovers (2013) in
Denmark; Smith, Smith and Verner (2006) found no
significant
relationship
between
female
representation on boards and Danish firms’
performance.
In sum, the evidence on the effects of gender
diverse boards on financial performance is mixed.
Since the data for the Middle Eastern countries is not
readily available, researchers were inclined to focus
on economies where data collection is not an issue.
Therefore, there is no evidence on the relationship
between gender diversity and firm performance in
that region. This study aims to contribute to the
literature by providing evidence from a region and
country, UAE, where no such a study had been
conducted before.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Literature has shown that better corporate
governance
practices
lead
to
better
firm
performance (Iren and Bathala, 2009). Diversity in
the boardrooms is one of the mostly researched
attributes of good corporate governance. Diversity is
perceived to increase the firm value. Proponents of
diverse boardrooms argue that boardroom diversity
enhances boardroom decision making by lessening
the tendency to engage in groupthink (O’Connor,
2003&2006) and increasing the diversity of opinions
represented in the boardroom (Ramirez, 2003 &
Polden, 2005). Besides, the literature has shown that
women are financially more risk averse than men
(Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Ermer, Cosmides
and Tooby, 2008) which would lead them to take
financially more sound decisions. In a panel at World
Economic Forum in Davos, a moderator asked the
question: “Would the world be in this financial mess
if it had been Lehman Sisters?” and the participants
had agreed that the answer would be “No”, cause if
women were the ones to decide, they would be more
cautious and wouldn’t let the corrosive gambling
culture to dominate the financial decisions (The New
York Times, February 1, 2009). Furthermore, Adams
and Ferreira (2009) documented that gender diverse
boards are better monitors, more effective and have
less attendance problems.
Despite boardroom diversity is socially
desirable and believed to enhance the corporate
performance, empirical evidence on positive effects
of gender diversity is inconclusive. Although many
studies showed a positive relationship between
female
participation
on
boards
and
firm
performance, some failed to present a significant
relationship. Utilizing US data, Erhardt, Werbel and
Shroder (2003) documented a significant positive
relationship between gender diversity on boards and
firm performance when return on assets (ROA) and
return on investment (ROI) are used as a proxy of
firm performance. Using Tobin’s Q to measure the
firm performance, Carter, Simkins and Simpson
(2003) also confirmed the significant relationship
between women existence on boards and firm
financial performance. On the other hand, using data
from US Fortune 1000 firms, Carter, D’Souza,
Simkins and Simpson (2010) couldn’t verify a
significant
relationship
between
women
representation on boards and firm financial
performance. Bonn (2004) confirmed a positive
impact of female board members on the Australian
firms’ book-to-market ratios, while Nguyen and Faff
(2007) observed similar results on Canadian firms’
value measured by Tobin’s Q. In earlier studies,
Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997) didn’t find a
significant impact on firms’ profitability and return,
likewise Zahra and Stanton (1988) found no
relationship between gender diversity and firm’s
ROA, profitability or dividends.

3. DATA AND VARIABLES
The sample includes 60 firms listed on the Abu
Dhabi and Dubai Stock Exchanges for the period
from 2005 to 2012. Since the directors data for
companies listed in the UAE exchanges is not readily
available, the data about the gender of the directors
is hand collected from the companies’ annual
reports. To identify the gender of the board
members, first, photos in the annual reports are
utilized. If the photos are not published in the
annual report, identifying pronouns like he/she,
him/her, his/her are used. If these are not available,
first name of the person is used to identify the
gender. If the name is a unisex name, an internet
search with the full name of the director is used.
Companies whose annual reports are not available,
missing or doesn’t include the relevant information
are excluded from the final sample. Data needed to
compute Tobin’s Q, ROA and the control variables
are taken from the COMPUSTAT database.
Consistent with the past literature (Campbell
and Miguez-Vera (2008); Adams and Ferreira (2009);
Carter et. al. (2010), Ahern and Ditmar (2012)),
Tobin’s Q is used a proxy for the firm value. Tobin’s
Q is calculated as the sum of total assets and market
value of equity less common equity divided by total
assets. Gender diversity is measured by a dummy
variable which takes a value of 1 in case of the
existence of a female board director, and 0
otherwise. As for robustness, percentage of female
board members is used as another gender diversity
measure.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the
sample firms. The average size of the firms in the
sample is AED 358 billion. The average board is
made up of 8 directors. Firms in the sample are
around 20 years old and their CEOs have been
serving that role for an average of 5 years. The
percentage of female directors in the boardroom is
quite low. However, when the number of female
directors is examined through years, an increasing
trend in the female existence in the UAE boardrooms
is noticed.

4. METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS
To understand the impact of female existence on the
firm financial performance, first the means of
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different firm characteristics across firms are
compared for the firms that have female directors
versus the firms that have boards comprised of only
male directors. Then, a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) model is estimated to understand the effect

of gender diversity on firm value and finally an
event study is conducted to see the impact of female
board members quota announcement on firms’
stock prices.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for sample firms. The sample includes 60 firms listed on Abu
Dhabi and Dubai Securities Exchanges for the period from 2005 to 2012.
Variable
Total Assets
Board size
CEO/Chair duality
Firm Age
CEO Tenure
Leverage
ROA
Tobin's Q
Female director existence dummy
Number of female directors on the board
Percentage of Female directors

n
287
228
230
280
135
264
264
264
218
222
222

Mean
358,417
8.237
0.026
21.657
5.607
60.258
2.264
1.052
0.064
0.036
0.004

The fundamental hypothesis tested is as
follows:
Ho: “All else being equal, gender diversity on
corporate boards has no impact on firm financial
performance"
If the fundamental hypothesis is rejected, it will
be inferred that the gender diversity affects firm
value. Significant negative or insignificant estimates
for the gender diversity variable must be interpreted
carefully, as it wont mean that female directors are
hindering the financial performance of firms.
Instead, these results might imply that the female
board members are used simply as window-dressing
(Helland and Sykuta, 2004).
When analyzing the female directors' effect on
governance, endogeneity is always a concern. While
it might be true that firms which have females on
their boards have better financial performance, it
might also be true that firms which perform better
and have better governance practices choose to
include women in their boardrooms. To control for
the possibility of the endogeneity, which could bias
the coefficients obtained, the following system of
equations is estimated using 2SLS:
∑

(1)

∑

(2)

Std. Dev.
3,978,183
1.768
0.160
13.175
6.577
662.075
7.856
0.555
0.246
0.187
0.019

Min.
29.23
5.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.06
-44.35
0.39
0.00
0.00
0.00

Max.
51,210,100
14.00
1.00
49.00
31.00
8,088.83
26.11
7.24
1.00
1.00
0.11

Norway, Italy, France, Belgium, Spain, Iceland and
Malaysia. Quotas have been seriously discussed in
Sweden, Germany, United Kingdom and Canada. By
the end of 2012, UAE cabinet has made it
compulsory for all public and private sector
organizations to include women on their board of
directors. The announcement is made to public by
Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE Sheik
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum on December 9th,
2012. He stated that: “Women proved themselves in
many workplaces & today we want them to have a
strong presence in decision-making positions in our
institutions. We have made a decision to make the
representation of women, in all the boards of
directors of companies and government entities
compulsory.”
An event study is conducted to understand the
stock price reaction to the initial announcement of
the quota. The standard market model is used to
estimate the abnormal return (AR) for stock i on day
t as follows:

ARit  Rit  ˆi  ˆi Rmt

(3)

Where Rit is observed return on stock i on event
day t; Rmt is return on Abu Dhabi/Dubai Stock
Exchange index on event day t; ̂ i and ˆi are
estimated regression parameters for stock i.
Market model parameters are calculated over a
-201 to –2 day estimation period, where day 0 is the
event date. Daily abnormal returns are then
combined to form cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) over several event windows

Where x and z are vector of several control
variables. Following the previous literature (Carter
et. al, 2003; Campbell and Miguesvera, 2008), vector
x consists of board size (measured by the natural
logarithm of the number of directors), CEO/Chair
duality dummy, CEO tenure, leverage, firm size
(measured by the natural logarithm of total assets),
return on assets (ROA) and industry dummies.
Vector z includes board size, firm size, CEO/Chair
duality dummy, CEO tenure, firm age and industry
dummies.
After analyzing the impact of gender diversity
on accounting measures of the performance, it is
interesting to observe same impact on the market
measure of the performance. Therefore, at the last
stage of the study, stock price effect of the
announcement of gender quotas on boards is
analyzed by event study approach.
In recent years, several countries introduced
gender quotas on the boardrooms; including

5. RESULTS
5.1. Comparisons of firms with female directors and
no female directors
In Table 2, means of firms with female directors are
compared with means of firms with no female
directors on their boards, utilizing standard t-tests
of
differences.
When
the
different
firm
characteristics are analyzed for firms with at least
one female director serving in the boardroom with
the firms without female directors, there is not a big
and significant difference in terms of board size (on
average 8 directors) or Tobin's Q (on average 0.941.05).
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Table 2. Comparison of means
This table presents t tests to compare the means for several variables between firms with female
directors on boards and firms with no female directors on boards. The sample includes 60 firms listed on
Abu Dhabi and Dubai Securities Exchanges for the period from 2005 to 2012. . ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10%
significance levels respectively.
Board size
ROA
ROE
Total Assets
Total Equity
Organizational Age
Average Price
Tobin's Q
CEO Tenure

Boards with female directors
8.7143
-0.3344
6.4344
59795.3
10079.2
27.4286
3.4822
0.9401
3.3077

Boards with no female directors
8.2549
2.4826
5.3971
497392
4551.8
20.2915
3.517
1.0529
6.0826

Bigger firms (average total assets of AED 59
billion) choose to have at least one female director
when compared to smaller firms (average total
assets of AED 49 billion) but the difference is not
significant. On average, firms with female directors
have lower ROAs (-0.33%) when compared to firms
without female directors (2.48%). However, this
difference is not statistically significant. On average,
more established firms (on average 27 years old)
employ more females in their boardrooms when
compared to younger firms (on average 20 years old)
and this difference is statistically significant. Also,

t-test
-0.95
1.27
-0.13
0.35
-2.84***
-1.93**
0.02
0.4947
1.38

firms financed with more solid equity base (AED 10
billion) choose to have female directors while firms
with less equity (AED 4,5 billion) do not have a
female director. And this difference is statistically
significant. These comparisons suggest that firm
characteristics might influence the firms' decisions
to include female directors in their boardrooms.
However, difference in means test only gives a
comparison. Therefore, further tests are conducted
to analyze the impact of gender diversity on firm
financial performance.

Table 3. 2SLS panel data regression of gender diversity on boards and firm value
This table presents 2SLS results for the relationship between gender diversity on boards and firm value.
The sample includes 60 firms listed on Abu Dhabi and Dubai Securities Exchanges for the period from 2005
to 2012. Firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q while gender diversity is measured by two different variables:
(1) a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if there are any female directors on the board, 0 otherwise, (2)
percentage of female directors on the board. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates
1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively.
Variable
Firm size
Board size
CEO/Chair duality
CEO tenure
Leverage
ROA

Tobin's Q
0.0338*
(0.0177)
.0886
(0.1166)
-0.1693*
(0.1045)
(0.1045)
0.0004
(0.0033)
-.00003
(0.00002)
.0052*
(0.0029)

Female presence on board
0.0132
(0.0201)
0.0514
(0.1708)

Tobin's Q
0.0293*
(0.0168)
0.1154
(0.1165)

% of females on board
-0.0007
(0.0014)
0.0309**
(0.0126)

-0.2392*
(0.1417)
-0.0111**
(0.0045)

-0.1783*
(0.1014)
0.0007
( 0.0032)
-0.00002
(0.00002)
0.0045*
(0.0027)

-0.0185*
(0.0105)
-0.0004
(0.0003)

0.0064**
(0.0027)
-0.1303
(0.1355)

Firm age
Tobin’s Q
Female presence on board

-0.0404
(0.0722)

% of females on board
Constant
Industry dummies
N
Adjusted R

0.0002
(.0002)
-0.0145
(0.0101)

0.4746
(0.3444)
Yes
107
0.0476

0.0468
(0.4873)
Yes
106
0.0928

-1.0442
(0.9333)
0.4562
(0.3342)
Yes
111
0.0487

-0.0372
(0.0361)
Yes
109
0.0734

female presence on boards is used as the dependent
variable.
In the Tobin’s Q models firm size, ROA and
CEO/Chair duality dummy are found to have
significant effect on the firm value. The coefficient
estimates for CEO/Chair duality is negative which
suggest that the firm value declines when the CEOs

5.2. Regression results: gender diversity and firm
value
Table 3 reports the results of the 2SLS panel data
regression. In models (1) and (3), Tobin’s Q is the
dependent variable, while in models (2) and (4)
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also serve as the Chair of the Board. As expected,
coefficient estimate for ROA is positive, suggesting
that more profitable firms have higher value. Also,
the significant positive coefficient of firm size
variable shows that bigger firms are able to attain
higher values. These results are consistent with the
literature (Carter et. al., 2003). When the hypothesis
variables are examined, no significant impact of
women presence on board on the firm value is
observed.
In the female presence on boards models,
CEO/Chair duality has a negative significant effect
which implies that when the CEO also serves as the
Chairman of the board, it is less likely that there will
be female directors on the board. When the female
presence is measured by the dummy variable, firm
size and ROA has a positive and significant effect,
which shows that bigger and more profitable firms
will be more likely to have female members on their
boards. When female presence is measured by the
percentage of female directors on the board, board
size has a positive effect, which suggests that in
larger boards there is a greater probability of having
females represented on the board.

These results might mean that the market
perceives this legislation as window dressing and do
not expect a change in firm value with the addition
of female directors, or alternatively, it might also
mean that the market is indifferent to having male
or female directors and do not perceive the gender
diversity on corporate boards as a value-enhancing
practice. Even though the quotas were announced by
the end of 2012, they are not fully implemented yet.
Future studies should look into the market reaction
to quotas when they are fully implemented.

6. CONCLUSION
Although the whole world has been changing
rapidly, empowerment of women is still a debated
issue. When compared to a few decades ago, today
women are more educated, highly qualified and
ready to assume responsibilities for high-level,
highly-impactful positions in the corporate world.
However, glass ceiling, traditional views on women
and social structure still prevents women to reach
higher positions. Even though it applies to the whole
world, in the Middle Eastern region especially,
women workforce is underutilized. Although the
female representation in the corporate governance is
socially desirable, the empirical evidence which
proves the positive impact of female directors'
existence on the firm value is still inconclusive.
Especially, there are no studies covering the Middle
Eastern region, partly due to the low number of
female participation on the corporate boards and
partly due to the lack of readily available data.
To fill this gap, this study focuses on the UAE
markets and creates the first dataset regarding the
boardroom diversity in the country. First, the impact
of gender diverse boards on the accounting value of
the firm is analyzed, followed by an event study to
understand the change in the market value of the
firm to the announcement of gender quotas on
boards. The analysis of the results has failed to
show a significant impact of female directors on the
firm’s both accounting and market value. However,
these results are mainly due to the extremely low
number of female directors serving on the UAE
firms' boards.
Future studies should investigate and include
more countries from the Middle East and compare
the different trends in different countries. Besides,
even after including more data to get better results,
if the positive impact of female directors on the firm
value cannot be proved, that doesn’t necessarily
imply a policy recommendation to lift or lower the
gender quotas on the corporate boards. Female
existence does not only bring diversity to the
boardrooms but it might also affect many different
aspects of the firm practices. For example, it is
important to research if having females in the key
positions in the firms affect hiring policies of the
firms, or creating perceptions of female corporate
leaders change the career paths of young women.
Also, an interesting further avenue for research
would be to compare the before and after the gender
quota implementation in the UAE.

5.3. Event study results: gender quota on boards
and stock price
Event study results are presented at Table 4. The
sample includes 47 companies with available daily
stock price data over the estimation period and at
the announcement date. Sheik Mohamed Mohammed
bin Rashid Al Maktoum’s announcement on
December 9th, 2012 is taken as the event date. Both
the average daily abnormal returns and the
cumulative abnormal returns over several different
event windows were insignificant. The results
suggest that the market has not reacted to this
initial announcement. When stock price reactions of
companies with female directors on their boards are
analyzed separately, all of them showed a positive
abnormal return, with only one of them being
significant.
Table 4. Event study- stock price reactions to gender
quota on boards announcement
This table presents the results of stock return
event study. The sample includes 47 companies
listed on Abu Dhabi and Dubai Securities Exchanges.
AR is the abnormal stock return for the portfolio of
companies used in the analysis in event time; CAR is
the cumulative abnormal stock return for the
portfolio of companies used in the analysis in event
time. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance
levels respectively.
Event window
[-1,0]
[0,+1]
[0,+2]
[0,+3]
Day
-1
0
1
2
3

CAR
-0.238%
-0.004%
0.244%
0.192%
AR
-0.125%
-0.112%
0.107%
0.249%
-0.052%

t-statistic
-0.71
-0.02
0.56
0.41
t-statistic
-0.44
-0.39
0.5
0.73
-0.26

N
47
47
47
47
47
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